O
Osiris
In word2003, I want to have the chapter description (second level) in
the header, automatically adjusted from page to page, when the
description changes on a page, like the following example(line is page
separation, dotted is header "border"):
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.2 Individual rationality : the thin theory pg 21
...................................................................................................
providing any guide to the choice between the remaining. If we want to
explain behaviour in such cases, causal considerations must be invoked
in addition to the assumption of rationality. In fact, I argue below
that if we require rationality in the broad sense, this will be the
rule rather than the exception.
I.2. Individual rationality : the thin theory
Along the lines suggested by Donald Davidson , rational action is
action that stands in a certain relation to the agent's beliefs and
desires (which I collectively refer to as his reasons). We must
require, first, that the reasons are reasons for the action; secondly,
that the reasons do in fact cause the action for which they are
reasons; and thirdly, that the reasons cause the action 'in the right
way'. Implicit in these requirements is also a consistency requirement
for the desires and beliefs themselves. In what follows, the focus
will mainly be on consistency, but first I have a few words to say
about the three clauses that went into the definition of rational
action.
The first clause can be taken in two ways. One might either say that
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.2 Individual rationality : the thin theory pg 22
................................................................................................
here:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of
holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his
hold on the rope, he could rid himself of the weight and the danger.
This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen
his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen
his hold, nor did he do so intentionally.
Beliefs and desires can hardly be reasons for action unless they are
consistent. They must not involve logical, conceptual or pragmatic
contradictions. I shall first discuss consistency criteria for
beliefs, and then at somewhat greater length for desires.
To evaluate the consistency of beliefs is not difficult, at least on
the more superficial level at which we can assume that the beliefs
have already been identified.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
So when the actual chapter changes, the header changes with it
How do I do that ?
fr gr
Erik
the header, automatically adjusted from page to page, when the
description changes on a page, like the following example(line is page
separation, dotted is header "border"):
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.2 Individual rationality : the thin theory pg 21
...................................................................................................
providing any guide to the choice between the remaining. If we want to
explain behaviour in such cases, causal considerations must be invoked
in addition to the assumption of rationality. In fact, I argue below
that if we require rationality in the broad sense, this will be the
rule rather than the exception.
I.2. Individual rationality : the thin theory
Along the lines suggested by Donald Davidson , rational action is
action that stands in a certain relation to the agent's beliefs and
desires (which I collectively refer to as his reasons). We must
require, first, that the reasons are reasons for the action; secondly,
that the reasons do in fact cause the action for which they are
reasons; and thirdly, that the reasons cause the action 'in the right
way'. Implicit in these requirements is also a consistency requirement
for the desires and beliefs themselves. In what follows, the focus
will mainly be on consistency, but first I have a few words to say
about the three clauses that went into the definition of rational
action.
The first clause can be taken in two ways. One might either say that
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.2 Individual rationality : the thin theory pg 22
................................................................................................
here:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of
holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his
hold on the rope, he could rid himself of the weight and the danger.
This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen
his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen
his hold, nor did he do so intentionally.
Beliefs and desires can hardly be reasons for action unless they are
consistent. They must not involve logical, conceptual or pragmatic
contradictions. I shall first discuss consistency criteria for
beliefs, and then at somewhat greater length for desires.
To evaluate the consistency of beliefs is not difficult, at least on
the more superficial level at which we can assume that the beliefs
have already been identified.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
So when the actual chapter changes, the header changes with it
How do I do that ?
fr gr
Erik