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Public Key Infrastructure requires two cooperating parties: the
sender and the recipient. Both must have certificates. Why would
anyone want to send encrypted messages that the recipient can't
decrypt? What would be the point?
Actually only the one *receiving* an encrypted e-mail must have a
cert. Each cert has 2 parts: a private key the cert owner keeps
protected and a public key that gets doled out as an invite to have
someone else send the cert owner the encrypted e-mails. Usually he
gives it to whomever he wants (to receive encrypted e-mails) but it be
very public and millions could have his public key. You don't need to
protect the public key half of your cert. Anyone could use his public
key but they themself do not need their own e-mail cert. Only 1
e-mail cert is involved in the entire process and that's the one owned
by the recipient. Only the cert owner that sent out the public key
will possess the private key to decrypt the message.
Your e-mail cert is not involved, if you have one, when *sending*
someone an encrypted e-mail. You use the public key of the
*recipient* to encrypt your outbound message. The recipient uses
their private key to decrypt. The only one that needs a cert is the
recipient: they give you their public key to encrypt to them and they
use their private key to decrypt. This is a "pull" arrangement where
the recipient sends out invites (in the form of digitally signed
emails) to have others *send* him encrypted e-mails. Doesn't matter
if you have an e-mail cert. If the recipient didn't give you the
public key from THEIR cert then you cannot send them encrypted
e-mails.
The only person that needs an e-mail certificate is the one that wants
to RECEIVE encrypted e-mails. Encryption by using passwords on the
sender's end is a "push" arrangement and requires the password somehow
be delivered separately to the recipient. The OP's boss will need to
digitally sign his outbound e-mails so others can save his public key
(usually in their address book or contact folder). Then when
customers write to his boss, they will need to use his boss' public
key to encrypt their mails - providing they ever remember to do so.
That takes of encrypting inbound e-mails to his boss.
His boss having an e-mail cert does not take care of his boss
*sending* encrypted e-mails (because his boss would need the public
key from every customer to whom the boss wants to send e-mail). It
rarely works to get customers to all get e-mail certs (so they will
send you their public key). It's possible but x.509 has been around
since 1988, is probably supported by the vast majority of e-mail
clients (that support encryption), and has yet to catch on. Most
e-mail users look like deer caught in headlights when you ask if they
have an e-mail certificate so they can RECEIVE encrypted e-mails.
Besides using passwords for .zip files, other means are available to
encrypt e-mails by the sender but the problem is getting that password
to the recipient without obviating the security of the encryption used
in the first place. AES 256-bit encryption should be sufficient for
encrypted e-mails sent across the Internet. TrueCrypt is considered a
good encryption program and it defaults to using AES-256 (but you can
combine multiple encryption methods in TrueCrypt) but both sender and
recipient would need the TrueCrypt program installed -- and still
there is the problem of getting the password from the sender to the
recipient.